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Abstract
Many experiments comparing individual and group behavior find that groups 
behave more egoistically than individuals. However, most of these studies do not 
control for the influence of within-group decision-making rules that might have 
an important impact on group behavior. In this article, we report findings from 
laboratory experiments comparing individual and group behavior in a public goods 
game. We find that rather than cooperation levels differing between individuals 
and groups per se, the intragroup decision-making rule has an influence on the 
cooperativeness of groups. Groups decide either by majority or unanimity rule. 
While groups deciding by majority rule reach roughly the same level of cooperation 
as individuals, groups deciding by unanimity rule contribute significantly lower 
amounts to the public good.
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Introduction
A long line of experimental research has identified a bunch of factors influ-
encing the level of cooperation in social dilemmas (see Coleman and 
Ostrom, 2011; Ledyard, 1995). However, most laboratory experiments 
study interactions of individual decision makers and only a few (discussed 
in section “Theoretical assumptions about the cooperativeness of individu-
als and groups”) take collective actors into account. Yet, in many real-world 
social dilemma settings, the relevant actors are groups such as cabinets, 
political parties, parliamentary committees, interest groups, boards of direc-
tors, works councils, or families.
Most collective actors are not homogenous but differ in many aspects. 
Certainly, the way of intragroup decision making is one of the most likely 
factors to affect the behavior of groups. Acting as a group requires a deci-
sion-making procedure among individual group members. It does not mat-
ter whether this procedure is written down explicitly or, instead, rests on the 
compliance with informal norms, yet group action is not possible without a 
decision-making rule in place. However, the experimental literature lacks 
an examination of the effects of different formal intragroup decision- 
making rules in intergroup social dilemma settings. In this article, we chal-
lenge the assumption that group and individual behavior differ per se, irre-
spective of such decision-making rules. Therefore, in order to examine how 
cooperation is influenced by formal intragroup decision-making rules, we 
design a laboratory experiment which aims at answering two questions. 
First, we ask whether group actors behave differently from individual actors 
when both of these types of actors approach a comparable social dilemma 
setting. Second, we look at the decision-making rule which is applied in the 
intragroup decision process to ask what impact it has. Thus, our experiment 
consists of three treatments: we study individual actors, groups deciding by 
majority rule, and groups deciding by unanimity rule.
Our theoretical argument assumes an interaction of the institutional 
incentive structure of the intragroup decision-making mechanism and psy-
chological traits. Research in personality psychology has revealed a nega-
tive correlation between stubbornness und the cooperativeness of individuals 
(Goldberg, 1990, 1992). Under unanimity rule, this psychological trait 
comes into effect because the decision rule assigns veto power to all group 
members. As egoistic group members are more stubborn than more coop-
erative group members, decision making under unanimity rule is biased 
toward lower contributions. Under majority rule, the greater stubbornness 
of more egoistic group members does not play a role because they can be 
overruled. Instead, the median preference in a group is the expected out-
come. Hence, majority rule inheres a dynamic, empowering moderate group 
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members and thus leads to cooperation levels which are similar to coopera-
tion levels among individual actors. Our results support our theoretical 
claim. While we find no significant differences between contributions to a 
public good of individual actors and collective actors deciding by majority 
rule, cooperation rates among groups deciding by unanimity rule are signifi-
cantly lower.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: in the following section, 
we give a brief overview of related literature from social psychology and 
economics on group behavior and lay out our theoretical argument. Section 
“Experimental design and procedure” introduces our experimental design. 
In section “Experimental results,” we present our results, and the final sec-
tion concludes.
Theoretical assumptions about the 
cooperativeness of individuals and groups
Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest of experimental econo-
mists in team decision making. The experimental findings show that group 
behavior differs from individual behavior in several respects. For instance, 
groups were found to be more polarized in risk evaluations (e.g. Eliaz et al., 
2006). Most important for our study is evidence showing that groups behave 
more competitively and tend to act more selfishly than individuals. Thus, 
conflicts among groups tend to be more intense than conflicts among indi-
viduals (Abbink et al., 2010; Bornstein, 2003; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 
1994). Likewise, collective actors send less and return less than individuals 
in the trust game (Cox, 2002; Kugler et al., 2007), offer smaller amounts as 
proposers in the ultimatum game (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998), and exit the 
centipede game earlier than single players (Bornstein et al., 2004). However, 
groups do not act more egoistically in all instances. Cason and Mui (1997), 
for instance, find that group decision making in the dictator game tends to 
be dominated by the more other-regarding group member, and Bosman 
et al. (2006) find no behavioral differences between groups and individuals 
in the power-to-take game. Hence, the question arises which variables 
dampen or amplify the development of group-egoism and why.
In most papers cited above, members of the same group interact face-to-
face, deciding without a clearly predetermined decision rule. Consequently, 
little is known about the effects of formal constraints, especially intragroup 
decision-making rules, on group behavior. However, there are some impor-
tant exceptions. For instance, Luhan et al. (2009) use a within-subjects 
design, where subjects have to make decisions as individuals and as group 
members in the dictator game. Interacting via a computer network, group 
members have to reach a unanimous decision. In contrast to Cason and Mui 
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(1997), Luhan et al. (2009) find that groups transfer smaller amounts than 
individuals. Furthermore, they show that the most selfish group member has 
the greatest impact on the amount offered by a group.1 Kocher and Sutter 
(2007) analyze the gift-exchange game and vary the possibility to commu-
nicate during intragroup decision making. In one treatment in which groups 
interact anonymously via a computer network, groups have to reach a unan-
imous decision. In this treatment, groups transfer less and choose lower 
effort levels than individuals. However, in another treatment with face-to-
face within-group interactions, transfer and effort levels of groups are 
higher compared to the treatment with individual actors. To sum up, both 
studies suggest that the requirement to reach a unanimous group decision in 
an anonymous setting promotes group-egoism.
Experimental results by Gillet et al. (2009), however, challenge this 
explanation. Gillet et al. compare individual and group behavior in an inter-
temporal common pool resource game (see Ostrom, 1999). Moreover, they 
also implement two different group treatments in which groups either decide 
by majority rule or unanimity rule. The results show that the intragroup 
decision-making rules matter. Confronted with a nonstrategic intertemporal 
choice problem without competition between players, groups make qualita-
tive superior decisions irrespective of the intragroup decision-making rule.2 
However, in a strategic setting with other players, groups deciding by 
majority rule act more competitively and deplete the common resource 
more rapidly than individuals, whereas groups deciding by unanimity rule 
become more competitive than individuals only with repetition of the game. 
Gillet et al. (2009) conclude that majority rule promotes the development of 
group-egoism, while the effect is much weaker under unanimity rule and 
only develops in the course of play.
Overall, the experimental economics literature suggests that behavioral 
differences between individual and collective actors are influenced by a 
number of variables, among them the formal institutional rule under which 
intragroup decisions are made. However, the specific effects of different 
formal intragroup decision-making rules and possible interactions with 
other factors are still largely unknown.
The social psychological literature offers other important theoretical 
insights and empirical evidence on behavioral differences between individ-
uals and groups. For instance, experiments on the prisoners’ dilemma have 
shown that intergroup interactions are more competitive and less coopera-
tive than interindividual interactions (Schopler and Insko, 1992; Wildschut 
and Insko, 2007). This greater competitiveness of groups is termed “discon-
tinuity effect.” The social psychological literature cites three underlying 
causal mechanisms for this effect, two of them explaining how being mem-
ber of a group promotes greater greed in intergroup interactions compared 
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to interindividual interactions and the third factor explaining the occurrence 
of group-egoism by fear (Wildschut et al., 2003). Group membership pro-
motes greed for two reasons. First, it offers ways to legitimate more egoistic 
behavior because it reduces the identifiability of individual responsibility 
for selfish actions. Second, group members provide each other with social 
support to pursue their shared self-interest against other actors. Thus, group 
membership alters informal constraints governing collective decision mak-
ing. Groups act more greedily than individuals because being part of a group 
reduces the costs of violating norms promoting cooperative behavior. 
According to the schema-based distrust or fear explanation of the disconti-
nuity effect, actors reduce their willingness to cooperate in interactions with 
a group because they anticipate the greater competitiveness of groups and, 
therefore, respond by acting more competitively themselves.
The social psychological literature portrays the discontinuity effect as a 
generic difference between the behavior of individuals and groups and, 
accordingly, disregards possible influences of different intragroup decision-
making rules. Nevertheless, decision-making rules such as majority and 
unanimity rule can be incorporated in the given theoretical argument. While 
it is not clear how majority and unanimity rule influence social support and 
schema-based distrust, one could argue that the identifiability of individual 
responsibility for selfish actions is higher under unanimity rule than under 
majority rule. This is due to the fact that if a group decides by unanimity 
rule, all group members have to back a group decision. Thus, all group 
members are responsible for the final decision. Under majority rule, how-
ever, single group members can be overruled. This dilutes the ascription of 
individual responsibility for a group decision under majority rule, because 
it is not clear whether an individual subject actually voted in favor of the 
final outcome or against it. According to this reasoning, the identifiability of 
individual responsibility is highest in interindividual interactions and lowest 
in group interactions where groups decide by majority rule, with group 
interactions under unanimity rule in-between. The common social psycho-
logical view thus predicts generally higher cooperation rates in interindi-
vidual social dilemmas compared to social dilemmas with collective actors. 
Among intergroup interactions, it can be expected to find more cooperation 
when groups decide by unanimity rule compared to groups deciding by 
majority rule.
The interaction of institutional mechanics and personality traits
We argue that a different mechanism causes behavioral differences between 
collective actors deciding under different decision-making rules. The review 
of the economic literature highlights the importance of different institutional 
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incentive structures, while the social psychological literature underlines 
group-psychological effects. In the following, we will argue that institutional 
mechanics and psychological factors interact. Thus, they jointly influence 
group behavior. However, we assume that among the psychological 
factors, personality traits and not group-psychological factors are of most 
importance.
In order to make our argument more traceable, we use a concrete social 
dilemma game, the public goods game, as an illustration. The public goods 
game is a generalization of the prisoner’s dilemma. In the game, actors 
receive a certain endowment and decide how much of the endowment to 
contribute to a public good. Contributions to the public good are multiplied 
by a factor and then evenly divided among all players irrespective of their 
contributions to the public good.3 In addition, actors keep the parts of the 
endowment not contributed to the public good. Under the common assump-
tions of rationality and selfishness, keeping the entire endowment is a domi-
nant strategy for each actor. The game is a social dilemma because the social 
optimum is only reached when all actors fully cooperate and contribute the 
entire endowment to the public good.
Since the first public goods experiment by Bohm (1972), it is a well-
known fact that participants cooperate more than is predicted by theories 
assuming pure material self-interest. If the game is played repeatedly over 
several periods, cooperation levels usually decline in the course of the 
game, almost reaching the predicted level of zero-contributions in the last 
periods of play. An important factor explaining this decaying pattern of con-
tributions is the interaction of heterogeneous types of players (Chaudhuri, 
2011). Fischbacher et al. (2001) develop an experimental design to identify 
different types of participants. The largest group consists of conditional 
cooperators, that is, individuals whose contribution to the public good is 
positively correlated with the contributions of other subjects. Besides some 
nonclassifiable participants, there exists also a fraction of free-riders, that is, 
subjects contributing nothing irrespective of the contributions of other sub-
jects. Usually, the number of free-riders is much smaller than the number of 
conditional cooperators (e.g. Chaudhuri, 2011; Herrmann and Thöni, 2009; 
Kocher et al., 2008).4 Nevertheless, the presence of even a small number of 
egoists suffices to crowd out cooperation within a community in the course 
of several periods because conditional cooperators decrease their own con-
tributions if other subjects free-ride on their contributions and do not con-
tribute to the public good. This sets in motion a negative dynamic as 
decreasing contributions in one period lead to less cooperation in the fol-
lowing period. Hence, in order to prevent a race to the bottom of contribu-
tions and instead maintain high levels of cooperation in a repeatedly played 
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public goods game, it is necessary to establish procedures restraining the 
influence of free-riders as far as possible.
As the first assumption of our model, in line with the research on differ-
ent types of players in the public goods game, we assume heterogeneous 
individuals. Thus, communities consist of two types of individuals: condi-
tional cooperators whose cooperation rates are positively correlated with 
the other actors’ cooperation rates in a community and free-riders who do 
not cooperate in social dilemmas. If the actors in a public goods game are 
collective actors, these heterogeneous motivations have to be aggregated 
into a common group decision when the members of a group decide about 
the group’s contribution to the public good. The decision-making rule 
comes into play as a formal restriction of the decision-making process allo-
cating among other things positive and negative decision power, that is, 
rights to decide and rights to veto.
Majority rule balances these two rights perfectly: 50% plus one group 
members are needed to reach a decision and 50% plus one group members 
can block a decision. This creates a dynamic described by the well-known 
median voter theorem (Black, 1948). In case group members favor different 
cooperation rates, we can at first identify the median cooperator. In addi-
tion, we can identify all members favoring lower contributions than the 
median cooperator as low cooperators and members favoring higher contri-
butions as high cooperators. Under majority rule, low cooperators and the 
median cooperator prefer the median cooperator’s preferred contribution to 
the public good to any higher contribution, and vice versa, high cooperators 
and the median cooperator prefer the median cooperator’s preferred contri-
bution to any lower contribution. The median cooperator’s desired contribu-
tion level dominates all other contribution levels. Thus, there is no winning 
coalition comprising a majority of group members favoring any contribu-
tion level over the median cooperator’s desired contribution level. With the 
median cooperator being the most influential group member, the influence 
of majority rule on group behavior is conditional on the distribution of pref-
erences in a group. If the majority of group members consist of conditional 
cooperators, single free-riders can be overruled and the groups will be able 
to maintain high levels of cooperation in their community. Of course, if the 
group consists predominantly of egoists, cooperation will be low.
Unanimity rule, however, minimizes the individual right to decide 
because all group members have effective veto power. Consequently, all 
group members have to approve the common group decision, and a single 
egoist in the group could use her veto power to influence the group decision 
in her desired direction. The same is, of course, true for individual group 
members with a strong preference for high rates of cooperation. Therefore, 
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if we only take formal institutional constraints induced by the voting rule 
into account, we cannot say whether to expect higher or lower contributions 
under unanimity rule compared to contributions under majority rule because 
all contribution levels between the lowest desired contribution in a group 
and the highest desired contribution are undominated.
At this point, psychological factors come into play. Findings from per-
sonality research support the conjecture that under unanimity rule egoistic 
group members will prevail over more cooperative group members in 
intragroup decisions. The mainstream psychological concept describing 
personality structure is the Big-Five Factor Model (see Digman, 1990). 
According to the model, there are five basic independent dimensions of 
personality: extraversion (or surgency), agreeableness, conscientiousness 
(or dependability), emotional stability (vs neuroticism), and openness to 
experience (or intellect) (Goldberg, 1992). For our study, the second 
dimension, agreeableness, is of most relevance. Agreeableness is con-
cerned with the motive to maintain positive social relations (Digman and 
Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Graziano and Eisenberg, 1997; Graziano et al., 
1997). It comprises psychological attributes which are essential motiva-
tional forces in social dilemma situations, such as unkind versus kind, 
uncooperative versus cooperative, selfish versus unselfish, and distrustful 
versus trustful. In addition, agreeableness contains also traits characteriz-
ing behavior in conflict situations, such as stubborn versus flexible, incon-
siderate versus considerate, and quarrelsome versus agreeable (Goldberg, 
1990, 1992: 33). Thus, taken together there is a negative relationship 
between cooperativeness and stubbornness. Cooperative individuals tend 
to be accommodating while egoists tend to be more stubborn. Additional 
evidence comes from Antonioni (1998), who examines relationships 
between personality traits and different styles of conflict management. 
One of these styles is dominating. Dominating individuals are character-
ized as aggressive. They attempt to make sure that only their own needs 
are met. Thus, “a strong will to achieve one’s goals is necessary for using 
the dominating style; however, when using the dominating style, one’s 
desire to achieve contributes to stubbornness” (Antonioni, 1998: 342). 
Antonioni finds that the dominating style of conflict management is more 
common among individuals scoring low on the agreeableness dimension. 
Graziano and Tobin (2002) also examine attitudes in conflict situations. 
They show that persons scoring high on agreeableness favor negotiation 
and disengagement as conflict resolution strategies, whereas persons scor-
ing low on agreeableness prefer power assertion instead.
We argue that under unanimity rule, the negative relationship between 
cooperativeness and stubbornness comes into effect. If all group members 
have effective veto power and there is conflict about the group’s 
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contribution to the public good, the more persisting group members will 
prevail over the more yielding members. As uncooperative group members 
are on average more stubborn than cooperative group members, decision 
making under unanimity rule will thus exhibit a tendency toward lower 
contributions.
All in all, we thus argue that there is an interaction of the intragroup deci-
sion rule and psychological traits. Under unanimity rule, the preferences of 
all group members must be taken into account, but due to greater stubborn-
ness, egoists assert their preferences more successfully than group members 
favoring high contributions. Under majority rule, however, the greater stub-
bornness of egoistic group members does not take effect because the insti-
tutional mechanics induces competition between low and high cooperators 
to reach an agreement with the median cooperator. Hence, insisting on the 
desired contribution level does not pay off for low and high cooperators 
under majority rule, because they have to take into account being overruled 
by the other members of their group. According to this reasoning, we expect 
that collective actors contribute less to a public good than individual actors 
when groups decide by unanimity rule. With groups deciding by majority 
rule, however, we do not expect behavioral differences between individuals 
and groups.
Experimental design and procedure
We test our theoretical expectations experimentally in a linear public goods 
game, also known as the voluntary contribution mechanism (Davis and 
Holt, 1993: 319). All treatments of the experiment use the same general set-
ting. Figure 1 depicts the structure of a single period of the game. Due to the 
ambiguity of the term “group,” we differentiate between communities and 
actors. In our experiment, a community consists of four actors. In all treat-
ments, every actor is equipped with an endowment of 20 points in each 
period, and the task is to decide how to spend these points. An actor can 
either invest points into a private account or contribute some or all of the 
points to a community account which is labeled by the neutral term “pro-
ject.” The number of points contributed by actor i (i = 1,2,3,4) in period t to 
the project is ni,t (0 ≤ ni,t ≤ 20) with ni,t being an integer. All points not con-
tributing to the community account are automatically transferred into the 
actor’s private account. Actor i’s income yi,t in period t is given by the fol-
lowing equation
y n ni t i t k t
k
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Each actor earns the points transferred into the private account and half 
of the sum of all points contributed to the community account. The marginal 
return from the project is 50%.5 Hence, if all four actors contribute their 
complete endowment to the project, group welfare will be doubled com-
pared to a situation in which nobody cooperates. No community member is 
excluded from the distribution of points returned from the community 
account. Therefore, the project constitutes a public good.
Our experiment comprises three treatments, two group treatments and an 
individual treatment. In the individual treatment (IT), each actor is a single 
individual. Hence, IT conforms to the standard public goods game which 
has been studied extensively in the last three decades. Additionally, we run 
two group treatments in which actors are groups consisting of three indi-
viduals each. In one group treatment, the group majority treatment (GMT), 
groups decide by majority rule, while we impose unanimity rule in the sec-
ond group treatment, the group unanimity treatment (GUT). We thus study 
two treatment variables: the actor type (individual vs collective actors) and 
the intragroup decision-making rule (majority rule vs unanimity rule).
As in most other experiments comparing group and individual behavior, 
the amount divided between individual members of a group is simply tri-
pled, and every single group member constituting actor i earns yi,t (e.g. 
Bornstein et al., 2004; Luhan et al., 2009). This measure is important in 
order to preserve comparability between treatments for two reasons. First, 
Community account
“Project”
3 3 32 1 
Actor 1 Actor 2 Actor 3 Actor 4 
n1 n2 n3 n4
























Figure 1. Schematic representation of a single round of the experiment.
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our payment structure ensures that individual participants face identical 
monetary incentives in all treatments, and second, by implementing equal 
payments among all members of a group, we eliminate potential distribu-
tional conflicts within groups which might bias behavior in a way not con-
trolled for in the experiment.
Of course, a collective actor faces an additional intragroup decision 
phase in which the actor decides internally over the actor’s contribution to 
the project. Thus, while individual actors in IT enter their contributions to 
the project directly, group actors in GMT and GUT decide over their contri-
bution ni,t to the project by voting. In GMT, group actors decide by majority 
rule, while actors in GUT decide by unanimity rule. A group might need 
several ballots to reach a decision. In both group treatments, each subject 
has one vote in each ballot and group members cast their vote simultane-
ously. In GMT, at least two members of a collective actor have to vote for 
the same contribution to the project in order to reach a decision. If no two 
members enter an identical ni,t in the first ballot of period t, all group mem-
bers receive information on how the other group members of the same actor 
have just voted, and a new ballot is held. This procedure is repeated until at 
least two group members vote for an identical ni,t. Analogously, in GUT, all 
three members of the same actor have to vote for the same contribution to 
the project. If they cannot reach a unanimous decision in the first ballot of a 
period, all group members receive information how their fellow group 
members just voted and a new ballot is held. The voting procedure is 
repeated until the actor reaches a unanimous decision. Since all actors 
decide simultaneously, no actor is informed about the contributions of other 
actors in the current period while still deciding on its own contribution. Not 
before all actors have made their decisions, subjects learn about the contri-
butions of the other actors in their community and the distribution of points 
earned in the current period.
The game is repeated for 15 periods applying a partner-matching pro-
cedure to assign actors into communities. Partner matching implies that 
in all three treatments a single community consists of the same four 
actors throughout the whole experiment. Additionally, we also apply 
partner matching to form group actors in the two group treatments. 
Hence, groups consist of the same three individual subjects throughout 
the 15 periods of play. Our experimental setting thus mirrors social 
dilemma situations frequently found in the field where the same actors 
typically interact repeatedly over a longer period of time. In order to iso-
late the effect of the decision rule from confounding factors like direct 
face-to-face communication, subjects interact anonymously via a com-
puter network. Communication between subjects is thus restricted to 
entering their votes.
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Experimental results
We ran the experiments from November 2008 to January 2009 in the 
Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research using the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were invited via email employing the 
Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE) 
(Greiner, 2004).6 Each of the 344 subjects participating in our study took 
part only once. A total of 144 subjects formed 12 communities in both 
GMT and GUT, while the 14 communities in IT consisted of 56 subjects. 
All of our participants were students from the University of Cologne, most 
of them (71.5%) students of economics, management, or related fields. 
After arriving at the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to cubi-
cles where they read the instructions.7 The instructions to the experiment 
are written in neutral context free language in order not to influence sub-
jects’ behavior in a certain direction. Any questions were answered pri-
vately. We used a short questionnaire to test whether all participants 
understand the instructions correctly. In this questionnaire, subjects were 
also asked to calculate the resulting payoffs of several hypothetical 
numerical examples of contributions to the project to make sure that they 
completely understand the game’s dilemma structure. At the end of the 
experiment, subjects filled in a second questionnaire surveying demo-
graphical data like gender, age, and field of study.
Participants were paid in cash individually and privately. They 
received €0.10 per six points earned during the experiment. Including a 
show-up fee of €2.50, participants earned on average €10.52. The experi-
ment lasted about 1 hour. Hence, payoffs are equivalent to or higher than 
the average local per hour wage of €8 to €10 for jobs typically offered to 
students.
The analysis of our experimental findings proceeds in three parts. First, 
we compare aggregate contribution levels across treatments. Afterwards, 
we analyze how actors adjust their contributions to the project in the course 
of the experiment, and finally, we focus on intragroup decision making in 
the two group treatments.
Figure 2 depicts mean contributions per period to the project in the three 
treatments. In all treatments, the development of contributions shows a typi-
cal pattern which can also be found in comparable experiments studying the 
voluntary contribution mechanism. Overall, we find high levels of coopera-
tion in all treatments. On average, actors contribute 12.19 points (60.94% of 
their endowment) to the project. Starting with even higher contributions 
around 15 points in the first period, contributions decline steadily over the 
course of the experiment. In the last three periods, there is an end-game 
effect with rapidly declining contributions in all treatments.
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Despite these similar general patterns of play, there are also important 
differences between the treatments. Contributions are highest in IT, where 
individual actors contribute on average 13.19 points. Group actors in GMT 
contribute only slightly less (12.79 points), whereas contributions in GUT 
are substantially lower (10.41 points). If all 15 periods of the experiment are 
considered, these differences are not significant across all three treatments (p 
= 0.153; two-sided Kruskal–Wallis Test).8 A pairwise test, though, reveals a 
(weakly) significant difference between GUT and IT (p = 0.080; two-sided 
Mann–Whitney U-test). The differences between GMT and IT and between 
GMT and GUT do not reach commonly accepted levels of significance (p = 
0.572, p = 0.133, respectively; two-sided Mann–Whitney U-tests).
Figure 2 also reveals that subjects’ behavior changes in the course of the 
experiment. For instance, in the first period of the experiment, collective 
actors in both group treatments cooperate significantly more than individual 
actors in IT (GMT–IT: 16.73 vs 14.11 points, p = 0.059; GUT–IT: 16.40 vs 
14.11 points, p = 0.084; two-sided Mann–Whitney U-tests). In the follow-
ing periods, individuals in IT increase their contributions slightly, whereas 
in GUT contributions to the project decline rapidly. Groups in GMT, how-
ever, are able to stabilize the level of cooperation around 75% of the endow-
ment, so that initial differences between GMT and IT vanish.
The end-game effect in the last three periods of the experiment conceals 
more distinct behavioral differences in the preceding periods of the game.9 















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
GMT GUT IT
Figure 2. Mean contributions to the project.
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14.66 points, group actors in GMT 14.33 points, and group actors in GUT 
11.48 points. The difference between mean contributions in the first 12 peri-
ods is significant at the 10% level (p = 0.099; two-sided Kruskal–Wallis 
Test). Moreover, pairwise tests reveal significant differences between GUT 
and IT and between GUT and GMT (p = 0.054, p = 0.089, respectively; 
two-sided Mann–Whitney U-tests), but no significant difference between 
GMT and IT (p = 0.571; two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test).
Differences between treatments are driven by a considerable variance in 
the occurrence of full cooperation, that is, contributions of 20 points to the 
project. Whereas 49.29% of the actor decisions in IT and 40.42% in GMT 
result in a contribution of the full endowment of 20 points, the frequency of 
full cooperation is only 24.72% in GUT. The difference is significant (p = 
0.073; two-sided Kruskal–Wallis Test).
Overall, this first analysis of mean contributions to the project shows an 
effect of the intragroup decision-making rule on group behavior. Group and 
individual behavior do not differ per se, but the incentives set by majority 
and unanimity rule lead to different results in GMT and GUT compared to 
IT. While groups deciding by majority rule reach roughly the same level of 
cooperation as individual actors in IT, groups deciding by unanimity rule 
contribute significantly lower amounts to the public good. Our findings thus 
contradict the theoretical reasoning on the basis of the social psychological 
discontinuity effect, according to which we expected highest contributions 
in IT and lowest contributions in GMT with contributions in GUT in-
between. Instead, aggregate behavior seems to be in line with our explana-
tion, assuming an interaction between the institutional incentive structure 
and personality traits. We predicted lower contribution levels in GUT 
because of the greater stubbornness of more egoistic group members. 
Following this argument, we should find different patterns of intragroup 
decision making. In the following, we will proceed by analyzing the dynam-
ics of play, especially the adjustments of contributions to the project in the 
course of the experiment and within-group decision making in the two 
group treatments.
Adjustment of actors’ contributions in the course of play
As a next step in our analysis of the differences between treatments, we turn 
to the dynamics of play. At the end of each period, actors learn the contribu-
tions of the other actors in their community. As we argue above, conditional 
cooperators adjust their desired contributions in light of the contributions of 
other actors in their community. Hence, if the other actors contribute more, 
a conditional cooperator will increase her own contribution and vice versa 
decrease her contributions if the other actors in her community contribute 
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less. In a series of regressions, we investigate how actors adjust their contri-
butions between two periods. We use the following regression equation
Contribution Period Contribution
Lowe
i t t i t, , -= + + +α β β
β
0 1 2 1
3
  
 st contribution in community
Highest contribution





β   in community ui t i t, - ,1 +
Our dependent variable Contributioni,t is the contribution of an actor i in 
period t. As independent variables, we include the current period number to 
control for the time trend apparent in the data and the actor’s contribution 
from the previous period, t − 1. Furthermore, we include the lowest contri-
bution in the community in period t − 1 and the highest contribution in the 
community in the previous period in order to test whether actors are respon-
sive to the contributions of the other actors in their community.10
Table 1 shows the regression results. In all treatments, the period number 
has a highly significant negative effect on contributions. The contribution in 
t − 1, however, only has a significant influence on the actor’s current con-
tribution in IT. In the two group treatments, the group’s contribution in the 
previous period does not affect a group’s contribution in the current period. 
A likely explanation for this phenomenon is the influence of intragroup 
decision making. Actors in IT enter their contributions directly and it is thus 
not surprising that there is a highly significant relationship between the con-
tributions of consecutive periods. In the two group treatments, this relation-
ship is distorted by the requirement to reach a binding group decision. The 
fact that an actor’s contribution in period t − 1 does not significantly influ-
ence the actor’s contribution in period t underlines the importance of intra-
group decision making for the behavior of collective actors.
The lowest contribution of all actors in the community in the previous 
period has a highly significant influence in all three treatments. Hence, irre-
spective of the actor type and the decision-making rule in place, actors con-
tribute less the lower the lowest contribution in their community. This can 
be interpreted as evidence for the presence of conditional cooperators in our 
experiment who display negative reciprocity by decreasing their contribu-
tions as a reaction to low cooperation rates in their community. In IT we also 
find evidence for positive reciprocity. The significant coefficient of the 
highest contribution in the community in period t − 1 indicates that actors 
increase their contributions as a reaction to high levels of cooperation in 
their community. In GMT, this effect is only weakly significant, whereas it 
is completely insignificant in GUT. The complete absence of positive reci-
procity is a possible explanation for lower contributions in GUT in compari-
son to the other two treatments. Apart from that, the patterns of adjustment 
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of contributions in the two group treatments are quite similar. It is thus 
likely that differences between treatments are caused by other factors. 
Therefore, in a next step, we turn toward analyzing intragroup decision 
making in the two group treatments.
Within-group decision making
Neither in GMT nor in GUT, groups have severe problems reaching a deci-
sion. In GMT, it takes on average 1.73 ballots to reach a decision. There is a 
remarkable proportion of immediate agreement in GMT. A total of 65.56% 
(472 out of 720 group decisions) of all actors deciding by majority rule come 
to a decision in the first ballot of a period. The phenomenon of immediate 
agreement appears from the first period on and remains present throughout 
the whole experiment. It occurs most often in those communities which 
maintain full cooperation throughout a substantial number of periods. In 
GUT, where unanimity rule assigns veto power to all group members, group 
actors need more ballots to agree on a common contribution to the project. 
Thus, in GUT the mean number of ballots is 5.69 and only 15.42% (111 out 
of 720) reach a unanimous decision in the first ballot.
According to our theoretical argument presented above, we expect that 
under majority rule in GMT the group’s median cooperator will be able to 
enforce her desired contribution level as the group’s decision. Under una-
nimity rule, all group members have effective veto power. Therefore, if we 
take only the institutional incentive structure into account, we expect group 
decisions in GUT resembling a compromise between all three group 




Period −0.432 (0.091)*** −0.389 (0.060)*** −0.331 (0.066)***
Contributiont − 1 0.190 (0.062)*** 0.115 (0.070) 0.114 (0.067) 
Lowest contribution 
in communityt − 1
0.330 (0.047)*** 0.437 (0.050)*** 0.445 (0.076)***
Highest contribution 
in communityt − 1
0.324 (0.091)*** 0.144 (0.072)* 0.096 (0.068) 
Constant 5.473 (2.520)** 7.863 (1.310)*** 7.561 (1.621)***
R2 0.492 0.440 0.370  
N 784 672 672  
IT: individual treatment; GMT: group majority treatment; GUT: group unanimity treatment.
*(**) [***] Statistically significant at the 0.10 (0.05) [0.01] level (two-tailed).
Parentheses contain robust standard errors clustered by community with 14 clusters in IT 
and 12 clusters in GMT and GUT.
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members. In particular, no specific group member will dominate the group 
decision, but all group members will have a significant influence when 
deciding on the group’s contribution to the project. However, if our theoreti-
cal reasoning is true that due to their greater stubbornness, more egoistic 
group members use their veto power more effectively than more coopera-
tive group members, we should observe that egoistic group members exert 
a greater influence during intragroup decision making than cooperative 
group members.
For our analysis of the influence of individual group members on group 
decision making, we run a series of regression models with actors’ contribu-
tions in period t as the dependent variable using the following equation
Contribution Period Low preference
Median pr











To determine the influence of individual group members on the within-
group decision, we have to identify the group members’ desired contribu-
tion levels in a period. As a proxy, we take the individual votes in the first 
ballot held in a period. We rank the members of a group according to their 
first vote and thus identify low, median, and high cooperators in each group 
in each period.11 Thus, Low cooperatori,t is the lowest initial vote of the 
members of actor i in period t. Median cooperatori,t and High cooperatori,t 
are defined analogously. We also insert the current period number to adjust 
for the time trend in the data.12
Regression results are summarized in Table 2.13 First, we concentrate on 
majority decision making in GMT. Overall, the regression results provide 
ample support for our claim that the median cooperator enforces her desired 
contribution as the group’s decision. The coefficient of Median cooperator 
is highly significant and of substantial size, whereas the coefficients of Low 
cooperator and High cooperator do not reach commonly accepted levels of 
significance. Thus, the median cooperator is the only group member with a 
significant influence on majority decision making, just as our model pre-
dicts. This pattern shows empirically that majority rule vests the median 
player with a strategically favorable position. Rather than having to depart 
from her initial preference and opting for a more competitive or more coop-
erative choice, the median player in GMT can stick to her initial preference 
and wait for one of the other two players to adjust to her choice.
The analysis of the final votes in each period provides further evidence 
that in our experimental setting majority rule does not generally promote 
cooperative or egoistic tendencies in a group. In 137 of 720 majority 
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decisions, there is a unanimous consent of all three group members over the 
group’s contribution. This leaves 583 group decisions in which a majority 
of two group members overrules the third member. In 266 of these 583 deci-
sions, the overruled group member favors a higher contribution, and 317 
times a more egoistic group member is overruled. The difference is not sig-
nificant (p = 0.387; two-sided Wilcoxon Test),14 which again shows the 
attraction of the median’s desired contribution level and the resulting medi-
ating effect of majority rule on cooperation between groups. Obviously, low 
and high cooperators compete equally to reach an agreement with median 
cooperators.
Behavioral patterns of intragroup decision making under unanimity rule 
in GUT differ considerably from the patterns found in GMT. As in GMT, 
our regression results for GUT identify a highly significant influence of the 
median cooperator during intragroup decision making. However, we also 
find a significant influence of the most egoistic group member under una-
nimity rule. Although a comparison of the regression coefficients reveals 
that the influence of the low cooperator is substantively smaller than the 
median’s influence, the most cooperative group member only has a weakly 
significant influence on intragroup decision making and the effect is again 
substantively smaller than the low cooperator’s influence. The regression 
results thus show that low cooperators are less compromising than high 
cooperators. The fact that low cooperators are more influential in GUT is a 
clear sign of greater stubbornness of low cooperators. The dynamics of 
intragroup decision making thus explain the lower contributions in GUT 
because low cooperators use their veto power more effectively to pull con-
tributions downward. Overall, we can thus reject the hypothesis that deci-
sions in GUT are a compromise between all group members. Instead, our 




Period −0.192 (0.095)* −0.086 (0.043)*
Low cooperatort 0.201 (0.121) 0.315 (0.038)***
Median cooperatort 0.723 (0.082)*** 0.644 (0.043)***
High cooperatort 0.057 (0.120) 0.132 (0.061)*
Constant 1.967 (1.487) 0.289 (0.834) 
R2 0.398 0.703 
N 248 609 
GMT: group majority treatment; GUT: group unanimity treatment.
*(**) [***] Statistically significant at the 0.10 (0.05) [0.01] level (two-tailed).
Parentheses contain robust standard errors clustered by community with 14 clusters in IT 
and 12 clusters in GMT and GUT.
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results are in line with the theoretical reasoning that because of the greater 
stubbornness of low cooperators decision making under unanimity rule 
exhibits a systematical bias toward lower cooperation rates.
Conclusion
In our experiment, we study individual actors, three-person groups deciding 
by majority rule, and three-person groups deciding by unanimity rule in a 
comparable linear public goods setting. Our experimental results show that 
there is no generic difference between individual and group behavior. 
Instead, the within-group decision-making rule has an influence on coop-
eration between groups. Groups deciding by unanimity rule cooperate less 
than groups deciding by majority rule. The experimental results presented 
in this article support the theoretical argument that there is an interaction 
between institutional mechanics and personality traits. Formal intragroup 
decision-making rules determine group decisions with a different degree of 
certainty (see North, 1990). In our setting, majority rule greatly diminishes 
uncertainty about the outcome of the within-group decision-making process 
by generating competition between the more egoistic and the more coopera-
tive group member to reach an agreement with the group’s median coopera-
tor. The median player can enforce her desired contribution level by just 
waiting for the other group members to adjust to her will. Hence, the deci-
sion-making rule alone already determines an exact outcome and promotes 
neither more egoistic nor more cooperative decisions in GMT compared to 
behavior in IT.
Unanimity rule, however, usually leaves the exact group decision unde-
termined because all group members have effective veto power. This inde-
terminacy of unanimity rule opens an opportunity space for personality 
traits of individual group members to take effect. The analysis of the intra-
group decision-making process supports our claim. In particular, more ego-
istic group members tend to be more stubborn than more cooperative group 
members. Under the requirement of a unanimous group decision, more ego-
istic group members use their veto power more effectively to influence the 
outcome of the decision-making process in their preferred direction, 
whereas more cooperative group members restrain from using their own 
veto power to counter the influence of more egoistic group members.
Prior work has shown that unanimity rule in conjunction with an existing 
status quo might lead to the preservation of inefficient policies (e.g. Scharpf, 
1988). Under unanimity rule, a small fraction of a community can block any 
decision or demand substantial concessions in exchange for their consent 
even if a large majority profited from a proposed policy shift. Our experi-
mental results show that decision making under unanimity rule can result in 
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welfare-inferior outcomes even in situations without a predefined status 
quo. Additionally, our findings have important implications for the applica-
tion of the unitary actor assumption, that is, treating groups as individual 
actors. Being an important tool for simplification in order to keep models 
tractable, the unitary actor assumption should be employed with caution 
though. Our results emphasize that depending on the intragroup decision-
making process in place, the behavior of collective actors might systemati-
cally differ from the behavior of individual actors. We thus regard our study 
as an important step in order to gain an essential deeper understanding of 
group behavior.
A relevant question not covered in this study concerns the effect of com-
munication in between-group interactions. In order to determine the influ-
ence of the decision rule, our experimental design implements anonymous 
interactions within and between groups. We prohibit direct face-to-face 
interactions because these might have independent, barely controllable 
effects on the subjects’ willingness to cooperate. Most real-world interac-
tions, however, involve face-to-face encounters between involved actors, 
and it would be interesting to see whether the possibility to communicate in 
groups gives a stronger voice to egoists or to cooperators. Hence, studying 
the effect of intra- and intergroup communication and its interactions with 
the within-group decision-making rules is obviously a promising avenue for 
future research on group behavior in social dilemmas.
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Notes
 1. Luhan et al. (2009) use the decisions made in the dictator game played between 
individuals to identify the group members’ type. The group member having 
transferred the lowest amount in the dictator game played between individuals 
is identified as the most selfish group member.
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 2. Blinder and Morgan (2005), who compare individuals and groups in a pure 
problem-solving task with an objectively correct solution, find something simi-
lar. Team members interact face-to-face with either majority rule or unanimity 
rule as the formally implemented decision rule. They find that groups make 
qualitative superior decisions compared to individuals. However, behavioral 
differences between groups vanish as majority decisions quickly evolve into 
unanimous decisions.
 3. The factor is greater than 1 and smaller than the number of actors.
 4. On the reception of the concept of conditional cooperation in the political sci-
ence literature, see Hibbing and Alford (2004) and Smith (2006).
 5. In a community consisting of four actors, an incentive to free-ride emerges if 
the marginal return from the project is between 0.25 and 1. So from the theo-
retical perspective, the concrete parameterization of the experiment does not 
matter as long as the parameters are constant across treatments. We choose a 
marginal return rate of 0.5 merely for pragmatically reasons; employing a fac-
tor of 0.5 simplifies the calculation of profits, and we thus minimize the risk 
that participants commit computational errors which might bias our experimen-
tal results.
 6. The complete pool from which we recruited our participants comprises 
more than 2700 registered subjects. Nearly all of them are students from the 
University of Cologne, and the majority students are from the faculty of man-
agement, economics, and social sciences.
 7. Instructions used in group majority treatment (GMT) may be found in the 
Appendix 1. The adapted instructions of individual treatment (IT) and group 
unanimity treatment (GUT) can be obtained from the authors upon request.
 8. Unless otherwise indicated, all statistical tests use communities as independent 
units of observation.
 9. While in GMT and IT, the end-game effect is clearly present in the final three 
periods of the experiment, average contributions in GUT increase between 
periods 12 and 13. One could thus argue that the end-game effect is only pre-
sent in the last two periods. We therefore tested whether excluding only the 
final two periods changes the findings. The results stay virtually the same.
10. In order to test whether our regression models suffer from multicollinearity, we 
calculate variance inflation factors. The results show that multicollinearity is 
neither a problem in IT, GMT, nor in GUT. In all models, the variance inflation 
factors of all regressors are below the value of 2.5.
11. We rank group members separately for each period of the experiment. In order 
to test for the stability of the rankings of group members across the 15 periods 
of the experiment, we conduct Skillings–Mack tests. The test reveals constant 
significant differences between the rankings of group members in 69 out of 96 
groups in GMT and GUT.
12. We again test for multicollinearity by calculating variance inflation factors. In 
both models, the variance inflation factors of all regressors are below the value 
of 2.2.
13. If a group needs only one ballot to reach a decision in GMT, the group’s con-
tribution must be equal to Median cooperatori,t. In GUT a group’s contribution 
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must be equal to Low cooperatori,t, Median cooperatori,t, and High cooperatori,t 
in case of immediate agreement. Therefore, we only consider group decisions 
in which groups vote more than once in order to reach a binding decision.
14. We compare the number of times an overruled group members in a community 
favor a higher contribution to the project with the number of times they favor a 
lower contribution.
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This appendix contains an English translation of the instructions used in the 
group majority treatment. The adapted instructions of the other treatments 
and the original German versions of the instructions can be obtained from 
the authors upon request.
Instructions. Welcome to today’s experiment. In the course of the experi-
ment, you will have the opportunity to earn money. How much you earn 
depends on your decisions during the experiment. Your decisions remain 
anonymous to the other participants of the experiment.
In any case, every participant receives a show-up fee of €2.50. 
Additionally, you have the opportunity to earn points in every period of the 
experiment. After the last period, all points that you have earned in the 
course of the experiment will be summed up. These points will be con-
verted into cents in the ratio of 6:10. For 60 points, for example, you will 
get €1.00 in addition to the €2.50 show-up fee. The money will be paid out 
in cash at the end of the experiment. Each participant only gets to know her 
own final payoff.
During the experiment, communication with other participants is 
not allowed. Please do not ask questions openly! If anything is unclear, 
314 Rationality and Society 26(3)
please give us a hand signal. We will come to your place and resolve the 
problem in private.
The course of the experiment in detail. In this experiment, you will be mem-
ber of a group of three. Your group interacts with three other groups, and 
thus, there are always four groups interacting with each other. You will not 
get to know the identity of other participants of the experiment. The experi-
ment consists of 15 decision periods. In every period of the experiment, the 
procedure is the same. The structure of a period will be explained below. 
The composition of each group does not change during the entire experi-
ment. Thus, you will form a group with the same two other participants 
during all 15 periods. Your group will always interact with the same three 
other groups, whose composition will not change either.
The task. You will face the same task in each of the experiment’s 15 periods. 
In every period, each group receives an endowment of 20 points. Your 
group has to decide how to use these 20 points. The details of the group’s 
decision-making process will be explained later. Your group can either 
keep the 20 points to yourselves or contribute some or all of the points 
to a project. Your group keeps every point not contributed to the project 
automatically to yourselves. Your income consists of two components. In 
each of the 15 periods, you receive income from the retained points and 
income from the project.
Your income from the retained points. For every point that your group 
keeps to yourselves, each member of the group receives exactly one 
point. For example, if your group decides to keep all of the 20 points in a 
period, and hence, contribute no points to the project, you and the other 
members of your group will receive an income of 20 points from the points 
kept in this period. If your group decides to contribute 8 points to the pro-
ject, you and the other members of your group will receive an income of 12 
points from the retained points. Members of the other three groups receive 
no income from the points retained by your group.
Your income from the project. Your income from the project is
Your income from the project = Sum of contributions of all  
four groups × 0.5
For each point contributed to the project by your group or any of the 
three other groups, you, the 2 other members of your group, and each 
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member of the other groups you are interacting with receive 0.5 points. Let 
us assume group 1 contributes 13 points to the project, group 2 contributes 
19 points, group 3 contributes 0 points, and group 4 contributes 6 points. In 
this case, the sum of all contributions amounts to 13 + 19 + 0 + 6 = 38 
points. You, the other members of your group, and the members of the other 
three groups you are interacting with each receive an income of 0.5 × 38 
points = 19 points from the project in the period.
The calculation of the income is identical for each member of all four 
groups. Thus, every member of your group and every member of the other 
three groups receive an identical income from the contributions to the project.
Your total income. Your total income in a period is the sum of your income 
from the retained points and the income from the project. For instance, if your 
group contributes 14 points to the project, and the other three groups contrib-
ute 38 points in total to the project, the total sum of all contributions to the 
project is 52 points. In this period, your income from the retained points is 6 
points, and the income from the contributions to the projects amounts to 0.5 × 
52 = 26 points. All in all, you would have earned 32 points in the period.
The decision-making process within your group. In every period, your group 
has to decide by voting how many points out of your endowment of 20 
points your group wants to contribute to the project. Every point not con-
tributed to the project is automatically kept by your group. In every ballot, 
each group member has one vote. Your group decides by majority rule. 
This means that an absolute majority of the members of your group—at 
least two—has to vote for an identical contribution to project in order to 
determine the group’s contribution to the project. Possibly, your group has 
to vote more than once in a period, until at least two group members vote for 
an identical contribution to the project. In the following, we will explain the 
details of the voting process. At the beginning of a period, all group mem-
bers will see the screen as in Figure 3.
At the top left of your screen, you can see the current period of the exper-
iment. In the box below, you are asked to vote on the number of points you 
want your group to contribute to the project. You are given the information 
that the endowment of your group amounts to 20 points. In the box below, 
you can cast your vote. Please enter the amount that you want to contribute 
to the project in the box that says, “Your desired contribution.” You can 
enter your vote by clicking on the box.
You can only contribute integer numbers to the project. Your desired contribu-
tion has to be an integer number between 0 and 20 (e.g. 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, …, 17, 
18, 19, 20). A contribution of 6.3 points, for example, is not possible. If you 
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enter an inadmissible number, the program will notify you and ask you to 
enter an integer number. To confirm your vote, click the “OK” button. 
Please remember to confirm your vote by clicking the “OK” button; 
otherwise the computer cannot process your vote, and the experiment 
cannot proceed.
After you cast your vote, the box in which you entered your decision 
disappears. You are asked to wait until all other group members have cast 
their vote. The votes of every member of your group are cast simultaneously 
in every period. Not before all group members have cast their votes, you 
will get to know how the other members of your group have decided.
The proceeding of the experiment depends on the results of the last ballot 
held in the current period.
After a ballot, two cases can occur.
 • No contribution gets an absolute majority of two or more votes.
 • One amount of points is chosen by an absolute majority of the group 
members.
Both cases will be explained successively.
Case 1: No contribution gets an absolute majority of two or more 
votes.
In this case, you will see the screen as in Figure 4.
Figure 3.
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If not at least two members of your group vote for an identical contribu-
tion to the project, you will be asked to vote again. Again, you can choose 
any number of points between 0 and 20. Please do not forget confirming 
your vote by clicking the “OK” button; otherwise the experiment cannot 
proceed.
In the table below, you can see how the other members of your group 
voted in the last ballot of the current period. Your column in the table is 
labeled with “You are” written in red letters. In the example above, you 
would be group member 3. In the situation depicted above, group member 
1 voted for a contribution of 1 point in the last ballot of the current period, 
group member 2 for 18 points, and group member 3 (in this case you) for a 
contribution of 4 points. Accordingly, in the last ballot of the current period, 
no identical contribution has been chosen by at least two of the three group 
members. Therefore, another ballot will be held. As long as your group has 
not agreed on a contribution to the project, you will not get to know the 
contributions of the other three groups in the current period.
After repeating the ballot, the two cases as depicted above can occur 
again. If again no number of points receives at least two votes, you will be 
asked once more to cast your vote. A table shows you how you and the three 
Figure 4. 
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other members of your group have voted in the last ballot of the current 
period.
Additional ballots will be held until case 2 occurs: at least two members 
in your group choose the same contribution.
Case 2: At least two group members of your group vote for an identical 
contribution of your group to the project.
If an absolute majority of at least two group members or all three group 
members vote for an identical number of points to contribute to the project, 
no new ballot will be held. In this case, your group contributes the number 
of points that was chosen by the majority of the group members.
When all groups have reached a decision, another screen as in Figure 5 
appears. (There may be short waiting periods until the other groups have 
reached a decision.)
On this screen, you can see the distribution of votes of the last ballot held 
within your group and the resulting contribution of your group to the project 
(in the example above, 11 points). In an additional table, you can see how 
many points your group and the other groups with which your group is 
Figure 5.
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interacting have contributed to the project. In this table, the column of your 
group is labeled with “You are,” written in red letters. In the example from 
above, you would be group member 3 of group 1.
Another box is located below this table. In this box, you can find the total 
amount of points contributed to the project by all four groups. Below you 
get to know your income from the project and your income from the points 
that your group kept in the current period. In addition, the total amount of 
points you earned in this period is shown. In the first three periods, this 
screen will fade out automatically after 40 seconds. In the periods 4 to 15, 
this screen will fade out automatically after 30 seconds. In every period, the 
screen will fade out earlier if you click the “CONTINUE” button.
Subsequently, a new period begins. Again, every group receives an 
endowment of 20 points and is asked to vote on the group’s contribution to 
the project in the new period.
After the 15 periods, all your points earned during the experiment will be 
summed up. Your total payoff consists of the payoffs resulting from the 
points you have earned and the “show-up-fee” of €2.50.
As part of the experiment, a questionnaire will be handed to you after the 
last period. We ensure that the information from the questionnaire will be 
treated anonymously and that your data will not be revealed to any third 
party.
In case you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to 
your place to answer your question.
